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NOTE: WEATHERFORD v. BURSEY
Weatherford, an undercover agent for the South Carolina Law
Enforcement Division,' and Bursey vandalized a Selective Service
office. Both were arrested and indicted based on information given
to the police by Weatherford.2 At the invitation of Bursey and Bur-
sey's attorney, Weatherford attended two pre-trial meetings be-
tween Bursey and Bursey's attorney where possible defense strate-
gies were discussed. Weatherford, who intended to continue his
work as an undercover agent, advised Bursey that he would not
testify for the prosecution at Bursey's trial but did not disclose his
status as an undercover agent.
Subsequently, Weatherford's identity was discovered.' Because
Weatherford's effectiveness as an undercover agent was terminated,
he testified at Bursey's trial. Weatherford's testimony, however, was
limited solely to Bursey's participation in the offense charged. No
mention was made of what transpired at the defense meetings which
Weatherford attended. Bursey was convicted and served an eight-
een month sentence.
Upon his release4 Bursey instituted an action for damages
against Weatherford and Strom, the director of SLED, based on 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 5 claiming that the presence of Weatherford at meet-
ings between Bursey and his attorney and the alleged communica-
tion of what was learned by prosecution officials violated Bursey's
sixth amendment right' to effective representation by counsel.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court,7 adopting a per se rule that "whenever the prosecution know-
1. [hereinafter cited as SLED].
2. Weatherford's efforts to maintain his appearance as a co-defendant extended to
retaining his own counsel and advising Bursey that he intended to obtain severance of his
trial from that of Bursey.
3. Weatherford was seen vacationing with known SLED agents by one of Bursey's
friends. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483, 485 n.2 (4th Cir. 1975).
4. Neither an appeal of his conviction nor a habeas corpus proceeding was available to
Bursey since he had served his sentence.
5. (1970). The section reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
6. U.S. Const. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
7. The district court, in an unreported opinion, found that Bursey's constitutional
rights had not been violated by Weatherford's presence at the defense meetings. The court
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ingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client relation-
ship the right to counsel is sufficiently endangered to require rever-
sal and a new trial."8 The United States Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals, holding that Bursey's sixth amendment right
to counsel had not been violated.' Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545 (1977).
The sixth amendment right to effective representation by coun-
sel has been construed to encompass the right to consult freely with
counsel at all stages of the investigation and prosecution without
governmental interference. 0 While the sixth amendment protects
against interception of attorney-client communications both inside
and outside the custodial context," the emphasis of this note will
based its holding on three specific findings of fact. These findings were that Weatherford
neither initiated the meetings nor sought any information from Bursey or his attorney, hence,
there was no "gross" intrusion upon the confidential relationship between Bursey and his
attorney; Bursey was not prejudiced by Weatherford's presence at the meetings because
Weatherford had not discussed what had transpired at the meetings, either with his superiors
or the prosecution officials; and Weatherford's actions, especially his statement to Bursey and
Bursey's attorney that he was planning to obtain a severance of his trial from that of Bursey,
which was highly unlikely under the circumstances, should have placed Bursey and his
attorney on notice that Weatherford might be an undercover agent. Bursey v. Weatherford,
528 F.2d 483, 485-86 (4th Cir. 1975).
8. Id. at 486.
9. Anytime an alleged violation of the attorney-client relationship has occurred, the
concepts of due process and fair trial are inextricably woven into the sixth amendment
considerations discussed in this note. The Weatherford majority also dealt with possible
detrimental effects upon Bursey because of Weatherford's statement to Bursey that he would
not testify at Bursey's trial. It was determined by the Court that Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83 (1963), did not create a general constitutional right to discovery in criminal cases, and
therefore it was not a violation of the defendant's right to due process to introduce a
"surprise" witness. In addition, the allegation that the defendant was denied an opportunity
to plea bargain was not upheld, because the Court found there to be no constitutional right
to plea bargain. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559-61 (1977).
10. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976). A seventeen hour overnight recess was
called between the direct examination of the defendant and the subsequent cross-
examination. The trial judge ordered the defendant not to talk to anyone concerning the trial,
to prohibit coaching of the defendant by his attorney during the recess. The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction, holding that the sixth amendment right of the defendant to consult
with his attorney during the long overnight recess outweighed any governmental interest in
cross-examining an uncoached witness.
11. Interference with attorney-client communications in a custodial setting have taken
the form of a requirement that a third person be present during attorney-client conferences
while the defendant is incarcerated, the monitoring of telephone conversations and censoring
of mail both received and sent by an imprisoned defendant and the placing of government
agents in close proximity to the defense table at trial. The courts facing these alleged intru-
sions in custodial situations have evaluated such factors as the opportunities presented to
attorneys and their clients to communicate in private during the regular visiting hours at the
jail or prison, reasonably necessary measures to insure security, reasonably necessary mea-
sures to insure that a trial will be conducted without undue disruptions and disturbances
caused by unruly defendants, independent sources for development of the information
learned
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be on the latter. Interceptions outside the custodial context, such
as that alleged in Weatherford, have generally been accomplished
either by electronic eavesdropping or by the presence of a govern-
ment informant during meetings between the defendant and his
attorney.
In Wong Sun v. United States2 the Supreme Court held that
any evidence which is obtained through exploitation of a search or
seizure found to be illegal under the fourth amendment1 3 is tainted
by the original illegality and must be excluded at trial" as "fruit of
the poisonous tree."' 5 However, the Court further held that if an
independent source for the challenged evidence could be sufficiently
established, such evidence would be admissible.
Where the Supreme Court has considered electronic eavesdrop-
ping as interference with the right to counsel it has been unclear
whether the constitutional violation has been founded on the fourth
or sixth amendment. In two per curiam opinions, Black v. United
States 7 and O'Brien v. United States,'" the Court apparently fol-
lowed the fourth amendment rationale of Wong Sun but never ex-
plicitly stated which amendment was involved. Each case involved
interference in the confidential relationship between an attorney
through the alleged intrusion, and lack of knowledge on the part of the government agent that
he was intruding upon an attorney-client conversation. In analysis of these custodial interfer-
ences the courts generally took notice of the special circumstances involved and found that
the state's interest in maintaining security was sufficient to outweigh any intrusion. However,
it was held that the defendant and his attorney must be allowed reasonable opportunities to
consult in private and that any information overheard by the intruder must not be transmit-
ted to the prosecution for use in the defendant's trial. See generally United States v. Brown,
484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); State v. Long, 465 F.2d 65
(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973); Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir.
1972); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); Smith v. Robbins, 454 F.2d 696
(1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Morris, 451 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Bullock, 441 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1971); Ramer v. United States, 411 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); Haas v. United States, 344 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1965), and
United States ex rel Cooper v. Denno, 221 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 968
(1955).
12. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Statements made by a defendant who was arrested as a result
of an unlawful entry into his house were excluded from use as evidence.
13. U.S. Const. amend. IV, provides in part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .... "
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
established the exclusionary rules for evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment
and sought to be introduced in federal and state proceedings, respectively.
15. 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
16. Id. at 485.
17. 385 U.S. 26 (1966) (per curiam).
18. 386 U.S. 345 (1967) (per curiam).
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and his client through governmental use of electronic eavesdropping
devices. The government contended that the information which was
intercepted was not used in a manner that was prejudicial to either
defendant,'9 but the Court remanded both cases for determination
of whether any information obtained illegally was introduced at
trial. Both opinions, however, were silent as to whether the Court
was considering a violation of the fourth amendment or a violation
of the sixth amendment as the basis for requiring a new trial.
Although not mentioned in either Black or O'Brien, the impor-
tant sixth amendment considerations involved in governmental in-
terception of attorney-client communications outside the custodial
context were dealt with at length in two prior opinions of the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals. In Coplon v. United States 20 it
was alleged that the government used a wiretap to intercept tele-
phone conversations between the defendant and her attorney,
thereby violating the defendant's right to effective representation by
counsel.2' The court held that a criminal defendant has a fundamen-
tal right to consult privately with counsel, both before and during
trial, and that such right cannot be "abridged, interfered with, or
impinged upon in any manner. 2 2 In an explicit rejection of the
prosecution's contention that the defendant has the burden of prov-
ing the exact prejudice suffered because of the intrusion, the court
quoted the Supreme Court in Glasser v. United States:23 "[Tihe
right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and abso-
lute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount
of prejudice arising from its denial".24
The court of appeals relied on the language in Glasser to formu-
19. In Black a telephone tap was utilized in an unrelated investigation and the inter-
cepted communications revealed no evidence useful in the trial of the defendant for income
tax evasion. 385 U.S. 26, 28 (1966) (per curiam). In O'Brien a telephone conversation between
the defendant and his attorney was recorded through the use of a microphone hidden in a
commercial establishment. The substance of the recorded conversation was a request by the
defendant that his attorney file an application relating to the territorial conditions of his
release on bail. 386 U.S. 345, 346 (1967)(per curiam).
20. 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
21. The lower court rejected this claim and was reversed by the court of appeals, which
remanded the case with instructions to grant a hearing to determine whether there had been
an interception of attorney-client communications. The court of appeals further instructed
the district court to reverse the conviction of the defendant and grant a new trial if the hearing
should disclose that the alleged interceptions did occur, regardless of whether any prejudice
to the defendant resulted. Id. at 759-60.
22. Id. at 759.
23. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).




late a per se rule which required the reversal of any conviction
obtained through the aid of an intrusion into the confidential rela-
tionship between a criminal defendant and his attorney. An intru-
sion by the government into the attorney-client relationship would
be sufficient cause for reversal and a new trial, regardless of whether
any prejudice to the defendant's cause had occurred.
Two years later the same-court was presented with an intrusion
upon the confidential relationship between an attorney and his
client which took a different form. Caldwell v. United States5 in-
volved the use of a paid government informant in the dual capacity
of defense assistant and government agent." The court relied on its
decision in Coplon in holding that the defendant's conviction should
be reversed and a new trial granted because the presence of the
government agent at meetings between the defendant and his attor-
ney violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights.27 This af-
firmed the per se rule announced in Coplon and expanded its scope
to include intrusion into the attorney-client relationship through
the use of an informant.
The Supreme Court's initial consideration of interference with
the attorney-client relationship outside the custodial context came
in Hoffa v. United States.2 1 In Hoffa the defendant's conviction of
jury tampering was based largely on the testimony of a government
informant 2 who had been present at several meetings between the
defendant and his attorneys during the trial in which the jury tamp-
ering occurred. 30 The Court assumed that Coplon and Caldwell had
been decided correctly but found the per se rule applied in those
cases to be inapplicable to the situation in Hoffa. The Court found
no violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right because the
incriminating evidence was not obtained by the informant in the
presence of the defendant's counsel. The defendant's incriminating
statements, which formed the basis for his conviction, were all over-
heard by the informant at times when the defendant's attorneys
were not present; hence no interception of attorney-client communi-
cations was involved. 3' The testimony of the government agent did
not involve any information which was protected by the attorney-
25. 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955).
26. Id. at 880.
27. Id. at 881.
28. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
29. Id. at 295.
30. Id. at 305. There was a great deal of dispute as to exactly what extent the informant
was present during the defense meetings in the defendant's hotel suite.
31. Id. at 308.
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client relationship and was therefore admissible because it was in
no way the fruit of an illegality as prohibited by Wong Sun.32 In its
holding the Court apparently expanded the exclusionary rule per-
taining to searches and seizures conducted in violation of the fourth
amendment to require the exclusion of information gathered in a
"search" or "seizure" that violates the sixth amendment.
Although Hoffa's conviction was affirmed, the Court, in dic-
tum, assumed that the intrusion by the informant into the defense
camp during the earlier trial was of sufficient magnitude to require
reversal of a conviction in compliance with the holdings in Coplon
and Caldwell.3 It can be inferred from this dictum that the Su-
preme Court would have followed the per se rule requiring exclusion
if the conviction presented to it had involved an intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship. Although not explicit in the opinion, it
appears that the Hoffa Court would have reversed any conviction
obtained in violation of the sixth amendment, regardless of whether
any prejudice to the defendant was shown.
34
The majority in Weatherford discussed three factors to be used
in determining whether an intrusion into the attorney-client rela-
tionship in violation of the sixth amendment had occurred.3 5 The
first factor was whether any evidence was obtained through or
tainted by35 an illegal interference with the privacy of communica-
tions between Bursey and his attorney.37 Weatherford's testimony
was limited solely to the events of the night the Selective Service
office was vandalized. Since none of this testimony was based on
information obtained through Weatherford's presence at the defense
meetings, the Court found that none of the evidence which led to
32. Id.
33. Id. at 307.
34. Despite the Supreme Court's apparent approval of the per se rule of Coplon and
Caldwell, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first lower federal court to adopt that
rule in a non-custodial situation. Bursey v. Weatherford, 528 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1975). For
the manner in which other federal circuit courts have treated interference in the attorney-
client relationship in non-custodial situations, see generally United States v. Choate, 527 F.2d
748 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188
(9th Cir. 1975); cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974); United States v. Fanning, 477 F.2d 45 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1006 (1973); United States v. Rispo, 460 F.2d 965 (3rd Cir. 1972);
and United States v. Zarzour, 432 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1970).
35. 429 U.S. 545, 558 (1977).
36. Id. at 552-54. The majority of the Court did not rely on the rule of Black and O'Brien
because it was felt that those cases were not intended to be constructions of the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel in light of the well defined fourth amendment prohibitions against using
the fruits of an illegal surveillance. Some emphasis was placed on the fact that neither Black
nor O'Brien even mentioned the sixth amendment in their short per curiam opinions.
37. 429 U.S. 545, 555 (1977).
1978]
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Bursey's conviction could be said to be tainted by Weatherford's
presence at the meetings.
Second, the Court considered whether any communications
between Bursey and his attorney were relayed to the prosecution.
The Supreme Court relied on the express finding of the district court
that Weatherford communicated nothing to the prosecution about
Bursey's trial plans or about the trial itself.38 It was held that
Weatherford was not a member of the prosecution 3 and therefore
no defense strategies were ever communicated to the prosecution.
The Court found that "as long as the information possessed by
Weatherford remained uncommunicated, he posed no substantial
threat to Bursey's sixth amendment rights."4
The final factor considered by the Court was the lack of intent
on the part of the prosecution or Weatherford to intrude into the
privacy of an attorney-client relationship. Weatherford was present
at the defense meetings because he was invited to attend by Bursey
and Bursey's attorney, apparently for Bursey's benefit.4 Weather-
ford desired to maintain his undercover status, and his attendance
at the defense meetings was necessary in order to avoid arousing
Bursey's suspicions that Weatherford might be an informant.,' The
Court acknowledged the need for undercover work and its great
value to law enforcement43 and disagreed sharply with the per se rule
of the lower court." The Court felt that such a rule would require
numerous undercover agents and informants to unmask themselves,
thereby eliminating their effectiveness in law enforcement.
The majority felt that the presence of any of the three factors
discussed above would necessitate reversal of a conviction involving
interception of attorney-client communications outside the cus-
todial context. If evidence which was tainted by the intrusion of the
informant was introduced, or the defense plans and trial strategies
of the defendant were communicated to the prosecution or the intru-
sion into the attorney-client relationship was for the purpose of
intercepting such privileged information for use in prosecution of
the defendant, there would be substantial prejudice suffered by the
38. Id. at 556.
39. Id. The Court disagreed with the findings of the court of appeals that Weatherford
was a member of the prosecution, which would make anything learned by Weatherford known
to the prosecution.
40. Id.






defendant and a conviction would be reversible within the confines
of the sixth amendment guaranty of effective representation by
counsel.
A dissent by Justice Marshall contended that the decisions in
Black and O'Brien compelled application of the per se rule.45 Mar-
shall enumerated three results which he felt unfairly benefited the
prosecution under the rule proposed by the majority. The first was
the tremendous tactical advantage obtained by a prosecution wit-
ness in the preparation of his testimony." A prosecution witness who
attended defense meetings would not only learn of possible defense
strategies but would also have the opportunity to formulate answers
to anticipated cross-examination. Second, the prosecution would
always be able to argue that the sole purpose of the intrusion into
the attorney-client relationship was to protect the identity of the
undercover agent.4" Finally, Marshall observed the difficulty a de-
fendant would have in proving that the informant did communicate
to the prosecution what was learned at the defense meetings. 8 The
defendant would have to obtain admissions by either the informant
or the prosecutor to prove that defense strategies had been commu-
nicated.
The most significant impact of Weatherford v. Bursey is the
unequivocal rejection of the per se rule announced in Coplon and
Caldwell. Because that per se rule required only the indication that
the privacy of communication between a criminal defendant and his
attorney has been compromised, a conviction could be reversed due
to an accidental and completely harmless intrusion even if the evi-
dence "fairly shrieks the guilt of the parties."49 In contrast to the per
se rule, the guidelines proposed by the Court in Weatherford provide
objective criteria to be applied to a particular situation, compelling
reversal of a conviction only when the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel has been violated by any one of three factors: (1)
introduction at trial of any information obtained through the viola-
tion of the attorney-client privilege; (2) communication of defense
strategies to the prosecution; or (3) a purposeful intrusion into the
attorney-client relationship.o
45. Id. at 566 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 563-64 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 565.
48. Id.
49. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).
50. The majority opinion distinguishes between the chilling effect on attorney-client
relations caused by the presence of informants and that caused by the use of electronic
eavesdropping devices. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554-55 n.4 (1977). The opinion
19781
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The disturbing aspect of the Weatherford opinion is the protec-
tion given to the identity of undercover law enforcement agents at
the possible expense of sixth amendment rights. The actual damage
to the guaranty of effective representation by counsel will become
evident only with time. Only interpretation and application of the
standards proposed by the Supreme Court by various courts will
indicate whether they are adequate to provide protection of sixth
amendment rights or whether a return to the per se rule of Coplon
and Caldwell is necessary.
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states that the impact of informant intrusions on the free exchange between attorneys and
their clients is significantly less than the impact of electronic intrusions. The diminished
impact results from the possibility of excluding third parties from conferences between attor-
neys and clients in situations outside the custodial context. This exclusion of third parties
significantly reduces the chance of any conversation being overheard. However, because of
the technological advancements made in electronics, remedies as simple as exclusion of third
parties are not available to the attorney and client subjected to electronic surveillance. This
inability to be assured that conversations are not being monitored could greatly inhibit the
complete exchange of information which is vital to effective representation by counsel. In
light of the factors discussed in the opinion, the validity of the distinction between informant
and electronic eavesdropping appears to be drastically limited. In any case involving the
interception of attorney-client communications through the use of a wiretap or other elec-
tronic device, it seems that the existence of a purposeful intent on the part of the government
would already be established. Under the standards introduced by the Court in Weatherford,
the mere presence of a purposeful intrusion would require reversal of any conviction obtained.
Id. at 557-58.
